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Time past and time future 
Are both, perhaps,
Contained in time present.
If all time is eternally present, 
All time is irredeemable...
Redeem the time.
- T. S. Eliot
Who? Where?
On a narrow definition of poverty on the order of 1,000 to 1,100 million 
human beings are poor. This figure is based on the "absolute poverty" 
concept which attempts to estimate the minimum expenditure/use of own 
production needed for existence at levels which are severely constrained 
but not in themselves life threatening (as opposed to life shortening). 
Shorthand formulations have been, e.g. the bottom 40% of India's 
households, 60% or more of total income/own use production necessary to 
provide diet averting severe malnutrition. A still tighter definition on 
the basis of consumption levels so low that any further decline would be 
immediately life threatening would probably cover 300 to 450 million. 
Respectively absolute and abject poverty are 32% to 34% and 9% to 13%.
The austerity of these definitions is demonstrated by the fact that by them 
0% to 1% of Northern European or Northern American populations are poor vs 
20% to 30% by definition whicn turn on minimum socially accepted/acceptable 
standards. This division of poor and absolutely poor is analytically and 
operationally necessary partly because socially accepted standards rise 
with typical consumption and service access levels and partly because poor 
in the broader sense would include 90% of the people of some South Asian 
(e.g. Bangladesh) and African (e.g. Mozambique) countries becoming rather
2unhelpful for causal or programmatic analysis or for policy focusing; 
especially as absolute poverty exceeds 50% and abject is 10% to 15%.
About one person in three in the South exists in poverty. However, the 
proportions vary: South/SE Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have ratios
exceeding 40% with Mahgreb/Mashrak (North Africa/Middle East) and East Asia 
around 20%, Latin America significantly lower and Middle (Eastern) Europe 
under 10%.
Of poor people about 60% are under 15, 25% adult women and 15% adult men. 
Part of this relates to gender discrimination and to higher numbers of 
children in poor than in less poor households in some countries. But the 
basic cause appears to be dependency ratios/labour power shortages. With 
the same income, more children mean lower per capita income while female­
headed households have low ratios of labour per household member guite 
apart from factors negatively affecting women's income.
Over the past decade the number of people existing in absolute poverty has 
risen but the proportion has fallen. However this is the result of falls 
in proportions and perhaps numbers in Asia and the Middle East and rises in 
numbers and proportions in SSA and Latin America. Even regional breakdowns 
conceal substantial national diversities. In Asia China, India, Pakistan's 
and Indonesia's progress has been dominant because they are so large. 
Bangladesh and the Philippines did much worse. The SSA scatter is wide but 
in few cases did proportions (and in still less numbers) fall. Not 
incidentally the three largest countries in population terms (Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Sudan) had worse than average results and trends.
The outlook for the 1990s is very much "through a glass dimly".
Proportions are likely to fall - dominated by Asia, with SSA the exception 
at no change even on a moderately optimistic macroeconomic scenario. If 
Indian and Chinese progress continues at late 1980s rates total poor 
persons could fall to 950 million but if it falters total numbers will 
change little. But that static result would conceal large absolute 
increases in SSA and Bangladesh (say 75 million and 10 million).
Running this type of scenario to 2025 would suggest Asian poor persons 
numbering perhaps 100 million (largely in Bangladesh) and Latin America 
plus the Middle East (Mashrak) and Central Europe very low, but with SSA 
and North Africa passing the 500 million mark. This contrasts with the
3present figure of 600 million poor people in Asia, 250 million in SSA, 100 
million plus in Mashrak/Mahgreb and somewhat over 50 million in Latin 
America and Central (Eastern) Europe.
These trends and perspectives suggest:
a. very low per capita output growth is a fatal condition (negative pre­
condition) for reducing proportion, let alone numbers, trapped in
b. the absolute poverty trap will increasingly be centred in Africa with a 
limited number of parallels in Asia (e.g. Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Afghanistan, perhaps Philippines, Myanmar, Indo-Chinese states) and 
Latin America (e.g. Haiti, Bolivia);
c. a renewed global recession or radical worsening of trends (overall 
economic and distributional) in China and India could virtually halt 
decline in numbers though probably not proportions.
Why?
Action against poverty and to empower poor people requires knowing why they 
are poor. One way is to categorise poor people by location/economic 
activity position. Here three broad groups with two or three sub-groups 
each stand out:
poverty;
A. Rural
1. Landless
2. Inadequate Land
3. Inadequate Techniques
- especially important in Asia
- significant in each region
- particularly important in Africa and,
perhaps, parts of Latin America
B. Urban
2. Low Formal Wage
1. 'Informal' - i.e. small self employed, casual labour
employee of small enterprise
- i.e. wage does not cover household costs
The problem of the division is that - especially, but not only, in SSA 
- most poor households (and even many individuals) have incomes from 
both sources.
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2. Internal Refugees
3. Natural Disaster
4. Economic Disaster
1. Refugees - transborder
- in home country
- pre rehabilitation of livelihood
- in practice hard to separate from A, B
and may benefit from same measures
These groups are different because in at least the first three cases 
rehabilitation of livelihood (on return to old homes or in new 
areas/countries) is the sine qua non to enable them to rebuild out of 
absolute poverty. The economic disaster victims may be more able to 
benefit from broad front measures and "enabling climates".
A somewhat different "Why?" categorisation would seek to check-list causal 
catalysts or dynamics. Main ones include:
1. general economic debilitation - zero or negative per capita growth 
weighs particularly heavily on the poor because their margins above 
survival are less and their ability to win in "what we have we hold" 
struggles is usually low;
2. ecological deterioration - poor rural households usually are on the 
poorest and most rapidly deteriorating land and urban poor live under 
the most polluted conditions. Poverty forces ecological degradation 
and pollution in a mutually reinforcing malign circle. In most areas 
desperate need destroys more tree/bush cover, degrades more land and 
pollutes more living space than greed - a reality which needs to be 
faced squarely because "let the polluter pay" approaches are neither 
practicable nor equitable in the cases of need driven downward spirals;
3. population growth - another spiral case because poverty causes high 
population growth which in turn makes enabling poor households to 
produce/earn more (per household and per household member) harder, 
limits fiscal ability to move rapidly to universal access basic 
services (including extension) and increases ecological damage by 
altering person/land ratios and average quality of land in use and 
increasing the overload on urban services; (Extremely high population 
absolutely - e.g. in Bangladesh, Rwanda, Burundi - or relative to 
accessible output capacity - e.g. much of Sahel and Latin American
5Alteplano, Central Kunene area of Namibia, Bihar - has the same impact 
but is less general.)
4. war - the human and the economic toll are far broader than defence 
bills, physical damage, direct loss of life. The loss of ability to 
live and to produce, the damage to service provision, the diversion of 
resources from increasing (or sustaining) infrastructure and production 
are substantially greater, e.g. in independent Southern Africa 1980-88 
the cumulative war bill exceeded $60,000 million (twice 1988 regional 
GDP) and lives lost 1.5 million (only about 10% direct war deaths).
The refugee and internally displaced poor are almost all war victims. 
The most massive war/poverty dynamics are in Southern Africa, the Horn 
plus Uganda, Mashrak (Middle East), Indo-China, and (especially if one 
estimates lost output growth) the Indian Subcontinent (including 
Afghanistan, Burma, Sri Lanka as well as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh);
5. natural disaster - the main component is drought and the second 
flood/storm (notably in Gangetic Delta) with earthquakes sometimes as 
damaging for those affected but far more geographically limited. As 
with war, it is the disruption and loss of production until livelihood 
rehabilitation is achieved which is the greatest 'contribution' to 
poverty - not the immediate human and property damage;
6. inadequate access to land/knowledge - lack of access to enough land of
adequate quality to earn/grow a living and/or to knowledge of how to 
use it (in SSA, but also in parts of arid or mountain Asia and Latin 
America, often because the knowledge does not yet exist) is probably 
the largest single cause of poverty. It is sometimes natural, 
sometimes the result of rigidities limiting migration, sometimes 
inequity (or iniquity) in access - usually a mix. As cited above this 
factor interacts with population growth and ecology to create malign 
downward spirals:
7. lack of access to basic services - basic health care, education, 
drinking water/sanitation, extension services (productive and 
human/social) are absent from the lives of most poor people. This 
absence reduces present productivity (illness, illiteracy, 
malnutrition, hours caring for ill and fetching water do not create an 
"enabling climate" for long hard work) as well as its future growth. 
Again the causes are mixed - real lack of resources (universal access
6to basic services in Mozambique would cost perhaps 35% to 40% of GDP), 
lack of efficiency (in access broadening) in use (e.g. clinic - 
preventative medicine - hospital mix) for technical and inertial as 
well as political economic reasons and inequity, and often elements of 
all three;
8. absence of safety nets - immediate survival food supply after
catastrophes is the only area in which safety nets for poor people even 
approaches being general. Rehabilitation of livelihood support is 
usually absent so that the nominal end of the disaster (and food aid) 
may intensify poverty. For the 10% on the margins of survival 
(including - perhaps especially - for households hit temporarily or 
permanently by a loss of labour power) focused survival, income 
rehabilitation programmes are the exception - e.g. some Indian labour 
intensive public works, Botswana's food supplement plus work rural 
support programme - not the rule.
Poverty - Pervasiveness
Absolute poverty is rarely a condition characterised only by low 
personal/household incomes. Most poor people do not have access to any 
basic services - e.g. if a country has 45% access to pure water (high in 
SSA) and 35% absolute poverty it is not unreasonable to presume that 
perhaps 75% of the not absolutely poor and 15% of the absolutely poor have 
access and if female primary enrollment is - in the same case - 60% of the 
age group that it is 80% to 90% for not absolutely poor and 20% to 25% for 
absolutely poor girls. Infant mortality probably usually exceeds 150 (say 
up to twice the national average) and life expectancy at birth rarely 
exceeds 40 (say 10 to 15 years below national average). There are 
exceptions to such generalisations but usually in cases in which systematic 
service provision is part of a strategy which is also reducing the % in 
absolute poverty on income tests, e.g.. Kerala, Botswana.
The degree to which absolutely poor people are excluded from or limited in 
participating in civil society varies but is rarely negligible. On the one 
hand they lack time (they need to use it to survive) and money and on the 
other, at best, absolute poverty limits the perceived ability and worth of 
a person. (The case of discriminated against minorities is somewhat
7different - they may have well organised structures in their own 
communities despite exclusion from broader civil society and they usually 
do have higher absolute poverty rates but their leaders are rarely 
absolutely poor.) To argue that severe poverty does not limit all aspects 
of life is either romantic, condescending or usually both. Certainly a 
person who chooses not to be rich and has adequate food, clothing, shelter 
plus meaningful work may be both humanly outstanding and a leader but that 
"voluntary poverty" is materially (and humanly) very different from the 
absolute, immiserising poverty which oppresses over 1,000 million human 
beings.
The links between low incomes and lack of access to services are not 
coincidental. Both are likely to flow from peripherality. This may be - 
at least in part - geographic. Most of the Sahel and Alteplano are far 
from economic centres and ecologically difficult. It may be economic - no 
valuable production has been (whether by inadvertence, non-feasibility or 
design) located there. It may be socio-political, i.e. 'wrongness' in 
caste, religion, ethnic group, sub-class, sex, age. But in a basic sense 
peripherality reduces power - the power to influence both market and state 
resource allocations. Since it is precisely those allocations (whether to 
employment creation, production by poor people, simple infrastructure, 
basic services) which create potentials for escaping poverty and an 
enabling climate allowing poor persons to do so the peripherality/power 
nexus is in the true sense a basic poverty trap. "Eradication of absolute 
poverty" (the World Bank's 1970s motif) cannot be achieved overnight but 
more sustained and general progress could be made toward it in most 
countries if the only constraints were technical and fiscal/financial.
Enabling, Serving, Supporting
In a poor country any viable strategy for struggling against - and
overcoming - absolute poverty needs three foci:
1. an economic environment which enables poor people to produce more (e.g. 
via agricultural infrastructure and extension) and encourages labour 
intensive production (whether public or private, large or small scale)
leading to rapid employment growth at wages near to or at the household
8absolute poverty line (with secondary household incomes or additional 
wage corners bringing the household total to safety);
2. provision of basic services (basic education and health, pure water,
extension) to all persons. (In this sector universality should be the
goal - targeting the poor before the not so poor are served is rarely 
politically feasible.) The provision of basic infrastructure in 
transport and commerce can be grouped here or in the previous section 
but - unlike basic services - may be largely private sector provided at 
least for commerce, road and water transport;
3. making available safety nets to those who cannot or will not support
them. In the case of those who are unlikely ever to produce - e.g.
mentally or physically handicapped, aged - these are the socially 
necessary costs for survival in decency. For those who are producing 
against handicaps - e.g. female-headed households - or whose needs are 
temporary - e.g. orphans, displaced persons/drought victims - the 
survival requirement links to services or other inputs to enable them 
to build or rehabilitate their livelihoods.
For a country with per capita output of under $500-600 per capita and 
population growth of over 2% to proceed rapidly with such a strategy it 
usually needs growth of output in excess of 6% a year or a large initial 
period of external inflows leading to such growth. The reason is not 
"trickle down" - quite the reverse. Without 6% (3 to 4% per capita) 
resource growth the additional incomes earned by the poor, the additional 
costs of universal access services and the better safety net systems can 
only be paid for by reducing the incomes-services-benefits of the not so 
poor. To do that substantially and sustainedly is rarely possible - vide 
Western Europe 1980-90 where making 60% to 75% better off at the expense of 
20% or more becoming clearly worse off is the result of competitive 
politics not of absolute resource constraints if absolute redistribution 
away from the not poor were politically feasible. Unless the country has a 
structural export surplus a 4% rate of growth of food production (and a 
higher one by poor agricultural households) is also needed until at least 
moderate and severe malnutrition are reduced to negligible levels.
In parallel there is a necessity for decision takers to give priority to 
enabling poor people to escape from poverty. Occasionally this can result 
from a "platonic guardianship" approach by leaders not really accountable
9to poor people - much of Central (Eastern) Europe did create a fairly 
effective low level employment-food-services system for at least a quarter 
of a century (1960-85). At other times it can come from leaders with 
marginal accountability to the poor and a good deal of leeway in policy 
making. Both Bismarck's Germany and the quite different Botswana and 
Tanzania (pre-1980s absolute resource constraints) leadership strategies 
appear to exemplify this. A competitive system may or may not produce the 
'expected' results. If absolutely poor and less poor do organise together 
and form a majority it may - but the not poor find it easier to organise 
and to use clientele systems to limit direct "poor power". Sri Lanka until 
the mid-1970s and Kerala are positive examples - pre-military rule Benin 
and 2nd Republic Nigeria are examples of the inherent problematics.
Targeting and Opting Out
Targeting on the absolutely poor (a slightly perverse use of military 
terminology) makes perfect sense for survival safety nets and - usually - 
livelihood rehabilitation. It may not in respect to services, 
infrastructure, and employment/productivity expansion.
First, the borderline between the absolutely poor and not quite so poor is 
narrow and programmatically hard to determine;
Second, some inputs (e.g. roads) by their nature cannot be provided for 
poor people only;
Third, even Chairman Mao advised an "all boats float higher" approach, e.g. 
a rural commercial network is essential to enabling the absolutely poor to 
claw their way above the poverty line, states run such networks very badly, 
co-ops are not always and everywhere practicable (or oriented to poor 
people) if private merchants are to do the job they must gain by doing so;
Fourth, the surest way to reach the peripheries - of geography and gender 
and of poverty and power - with basic services is to make universal access 
to them first a top priority and increasingly a fact.
The argument against "targeting" in the artillery sense is not an argument 
for monolithicism. Because there is a gender division of labour, because 
most women (but rather less than most men - at least in SSA) have
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overwhelming workloads, and because female-headed households have labour 
power scarcities, services to women and means to enable them to produce 
more cannot appropriately be identical to those for men. Because low cost 
housing and low cost urban services (or enabling communities to 
provide/purchase them) are the only way forward from the worst favelas, 
canisars and exurbs, different housing studies - artisan training-materials 
supply-water/sanitation provision, etc. are needed than for less poor 
centre city dwellers.
Self organisation by poor people may or may not be practicable. Successes 
in fact usually group absolutely poor and not so poor people and whether on 
locality, activity or gender lines usually are single cohesive, small 
groups or loose coalitions of such groups sometimes backed by a domestic 
national support group (or occasionally a state agency or a non-dominating 
external ngo). Their strength is in using space left open by stronger 
actors. Up to a point they can and do flourish but then tend to plateau, 
fail or be beaten down.
The reasons seem to be that for most absolutely or not quite so poor people 
what can be achieved without winning priority support and space clearing 
from a big battalion (the state or a powerful civil society actor) is low. 
If there are real achievements plateauing results; if little can, in the 
end, be done disintegration follows; if a big battalion takes fright, 
beating down ensues. Thus at some stage grouping of base poor/not so poor 
units with each other and with civil society units with at least compatible 
goals is needed. Whether this should be as a political party or an 
interest group; educational or pressuring; coalitional or confrontational 
is a contextual question.
It may well be that local "open space" is the place to start and that 
domestic, local ngo's are the best initial partners even though the power 
balance is usually massively uneven in favour of the external ngo. But to 
seek to build a Utopia of a host of domestic poor people's unions and a 
host of external ngo's is a species of self-delusion and a dangerous one at 
that. (If it cannot be done in Birmingham's inner city why is it possible 
in the favelas of Rio, the canis of Maputo, the rural slums of Southeast 
Malawi, the embattled highlands of Luzon and Mindanao). How to find allies 
is both contextual and unclear. Often, but not always, some religious 
groups and trade unions are potential supporters as are some journalists.
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Less uniformly some government bodies, a few substantial political parties 
and certain donors (usually with more enthusiasm than comprehension of the 
problem or competence in tackling) are alliance possibles. That of course 
poses a different question - keeping the absolutely poor heard and listened 
to and avoiding "smother love".
Population, Poverty, Policy
The present renewed enthusiasm for population policy is a slightly odd 
coalition in which, to date, the poor are rarely clearly heard and even 
more rarely represented. It includes middle class/high education do- 
gooders, raw "yellow peril" revisited addicts and mono-visioned 
macroeconomic balancers as well as (rather more than) more sensitive 
demographers, social scientists and activists.
Certainly extreme over-population - given available resources and 
technology - can be natural ecology and human environment destructive.
Even more frequently rapid population growth has the same results plus 
eating into the resources needed to raise productivity and broaden 
services. Equally certainly family spacing and family planning by poor (or 
other) households are, at best, greatly constrained if relevant knowledge 
and technology are not made available and backed by explanation and 
education to the initially unconcerned or doubtful.
But absolute poverty also causes high birth rates. The profile of high 
birthrate countries and social groups is fairly standard: high infant 
mortality, low female literacy, limited access to basic preventative and 
curative health care, dependence on children for old age security, high 
moderate and severe malnutrition, often plus one or more special contextual 
factors. The implications should be clear: programmes to reduce infant and 
young child mortality and moderate/severe malnutrition, to increase adult 
education and to broaden access to basic health care and pure water as well 
as building at least some public sector survival safety nets are an 
important (usually a necessary) counterpart to direct family 
spacing/planning promotion and facility providing. A coherent population 
strategy must look at both of these sets of approaches at once or it is 
unlikely to be very effective, especially among absolutely poor people.
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Envoi
The absolutely poor will be with us (if we choose to see them) in 2000.
The question is whether they will be more or less numerous than today, i.e. 
whether there is a trend to eradicate poverty. That question is starkest 
in SSA.
Posed in these terms the issues are ones of resources allocated, efficiency 
of use, political priority. Beyond survival, absolute poverty is usually 
very much a minority concern amonq non-poor people, North and South alike. 
(This is not really altered by extended family systems - relatively few 
absolutely poor people seem to be in extended families with significant 
numbers of not poor or almost not poor members to show solidarity. That is 
not to say extended families do not affect absolute poverty but rather that 
successful ones have enough non-poor members to see that few, if any, 
reasonably close relatives do descend into absolute poverty.) This does 
place a duty on them to educate and to raise/influence the allocation of 
resources - in civil society, in political groups, in cause organisations 
(e.g. Christian Aid), in their working lives (e.g. as civil servants, trade 
unionists, politicians, business persons, educators). The task is not 
hopeless (Sysephian as it often seems) but it is not one for a day, a week, 
a month, a year or even a decade and it is one - as the UK and USA inner 
cities (and the new tent towns of Tel Aviv) demonstrate - in which 
apparently small shifts in priorities and policies can halt progress or 
cause regress.
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